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Essay
WHEN RACISTS AND RADICALS MEET
Ronald J. Bacigal*
Margaret Ivey Bacigal**
INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1979, an ideological clash between political extremists
erupted into armed confrontation in Greensboro, North Carolina. The vi-
olence was triggered by a "Death to the Klan" rally which pitted the
Communist Worker's Party against the Ku Klux Klan and a small group
of American Nazis. Within eighty-eight seconds of their meeting, these
volatile groups fired thirty-three shots and left five participants dead on
the streets of Greensboro.1
The violence in Greensboro stands as one of the bloodiest and most
dramatic episodes in the history of this nation's civil rights movement.
The tragedy served as the basis for a public television documentary, 88
Seconds in Greensboro, and an off-Broadway play entitled Jerico.2 De-
spite the extensive publicity, there has been little academic analysis of the
Greensboro incident. This neglect may be due to the fact that litigation
surrounding the occurrence was confined to the trial court level, thus de-
priving legal scholars of published appellate opinions which might clarify
the factual situation and frame the issues in broad jurisprudential terms.3
In order to stimulate scholarly discussion, this Essay presents an empir-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
** Member of the Virginia Bar.
See Taylor, Waller v. Butkovich: Lessons in Strategy and Tenacity for Civil Rights Litigators,
1 POLICE MISCONDUCT & Civ. RTs. L. REP. 145 (1986); Shootout in Greensboro, TIME, Nov. 12,
1979, at 31.
2 See infra Appendix A.
' All published opinions on the Greensboro incident address procedural rulings. See Waller v.
Butkovich, 605 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942 (M.D.N.C.
1984); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
ical account of the Greensboro incident from the perspective of those who
participated in the episode and in the resulting civil rights trial. The Es-
say traces the circumstances leading to the violence and reviews the resul-
tant litigation with special attention given to the role of the trial judge in
politically volatile cases. The candid reflections offered by the trial judge
and other participants allow the reader to examine both the event and the
litigation, not merely in the abstract, but as implemented by flesh-and-
blood lawyers, litigants, and judges.
A. The Role of the Trial Judge
The role the trial judge plays in civil rights litigation is frequently ig-
nored because legal scholarship often seems preoccupied with the United
States Supreme Court. From Chief Justice John Marshall to recent nomi-
nee Robert Bork, the personalities and judicial philosophies of Supreme
Court Justices attract national attention4 while trial judges ply their own
form of jurisprudence in virtual obscurity. Scholarly neglect of the trial
courts has perpetuated a tendency to dismiss federal district (trial) judges
as third-string players whose errors can always be reversed by the appel-
late courts. The lack of interest in trial courts helps obscure the fact that:
United States district judges do damnably important business in our
nation. Their decisions affect how we make and spend our money,
where our children attend school, our neighborhood living patterns,
the quality of the environment around us, how the big national cor-
porations conduct their affairs, how our society punishes its violent
and its white-collar criminals.'
Perhaps the ultimate embodiment of a trial judge's power to alter social
conditions rests in the personage of Federal District Judge Robert R.
Merhige, Jr., who presided over the civil rights litigation arising from the
violence in Greensboro. Judge Merhige is one of this nation's most
respected trial judges, and a forthcoming biography' recounts his involve-
ment in a number of high visibility trials such as the Dalkon Shield/A.
" See, e.g., Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and
the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J.
71.
j. GOULDEN, THE BENCH WARMERS 2-3 (1974).
6 This Essay is excerpted from the biography. All rights reserved.
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H. Robins bankruptcy proceeding,7 the Westinghouse Uranium case (per-
haps the first of the modern-day "complex" cases to attract national atten-
tion),8 and the Kepone pollution case in which Judge Merhige imposed
the largest fine recorded under federal antipollution laws.9 The judge has
also been involved in a number of important civil rights cases including
litigation surrounding the impeachment of President Nixon,1" the Black
Power and Vietnam War protests," the prisoners' rights movement, ," the
Indian uprising at Wounded Knee,13 and a school integration case which
split the United States Supreme Court in a four-to-four vote.1 4 No other
trial judge, state or federal, has been at the center of so many controversial
cases, cases which have cut to the heart of many weighty issues in
America in the last few decades.
Judge Merhige's performance in so many landmark cases has prompted
his admirers to label him a problem-solver and a judicial activist1" who
uses his power to correct the injustices prevalent in our society. His critics,
however, charge that the judge pushes his judicial power to its limits, 6
and that he plays a "strikingly activist judicial role of a kind not often
seen in federal courtrooms.'1 7 When Judge Merhige was assigned to pre-
side over the Greensboro case, both admirers and critics of the judge pre-
dicted that the trial would become a morality play in which the "activist"
See McCallister, Trying Times, Trying Cases, 74 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1988, at 48.
See Bacigal, An Empirical Case Study of Informal Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 OIo
ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (1988).
1 See Bacigal & Bacigal, Criminal Prosecutions in Environmental Law: A Study of the "Ke-
pone" Case, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 291 (1987).
1 See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 589 (1978);
United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11 One of Judge Merhige's first judicial acts was to order the release of militant black power
leader H. Rap Brown. Judge Merhige was also the first federal judge to rule that the Vietnam
conflict was a "war" within the meaning of the Constitution. Interviews with the Honorable Robert
R. Merhige, Jr., in Richmond, Va. (1985-1987) [hereinafter Merhige interview].
12 See Bacigal, Annals of the Prisoners' Rights Movement: The Contribution ofJudge Merhige,
24 CRIM. L. BULL. 521 (1988).
" See Baciga,Judicial Reflections Upon the 1973 Uprising at Wounded Knee, 2 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1989).
14 See Bacigal & Bacigal, A Case Study of the Federal Judiciary's Role in Court-Ordered Bus-
ing: The Professional and Personal Experiences of U.S. District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., 3 J.
L. & POL. 693 (1987).
'5 Statement of Professor A.E. Dick Howard, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 4, col. 2.
19 Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
17 Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1989, at H9, col. 1.
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judge would inteiject his own views of justice and equity. The accuracy of
that prediction can be tested only by placing the judge's performance
within the entire context from which the controversy arose. This Essay
describes that context and provides a basis for assessing the manner in
which a trial judge can influence and control the proceedings in cases
which impact social and political conditions in our society.
B. The Background of the Case
Described in the 1950s by Princeton sociologists as "one of the most
prosperous and industrialized political units in the state,"' 8 Greensboro
was labelled the nation's third most desirable place to live in 1981.1 The
city, however, is a study in contrasts and the events of November 3, 1979
reflect its diverse historic, economic, and social heritage. Named after
General Nathaniel Greene, who defeated Cornwallis' forces at the Battle
of Guilford Courthouse, Greensboro was an early center for Quaker anti-
slavery activity. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, con-
struction of the area's textile mills brought increased racial and economic
diversity. The resulting economic prosperity led to a flourishing of educa-
tion as five institutions of higher learning were established in Greensboro,
including the predominantly black A & T State University and Bennett
College. These institutions helped develop a black middle class popula-
tion."0 Paradoxically, predominantly black, low-income housing projects
also existed within the shadow of the two colleges. The poverty in the
black communities combined with the heightened expectations of black
college students to lead Greensboro into the civil rights movement of the
1960s.
The first sit-in strike in the nation occurred in Greensboro when four
black A & T University students sat at Woolworth's "all white" lunch
counter and demanded to be served. The incident opened the era of sit-ins
and a new stage of the civil rights movement. Throughout the early 1960s,
's W. CHAFEE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE
BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 19 (1980).
19 R. BOYER & D_ SAVAGEAU, PLAcES RATED ALMANAC 370 (1981).
'0 The Washington Post described Greensboro as bearing "the trappings of newly-found black
success. More neighborhoods are integrated, many blacks have become affluent at an earlier age, the
school system is no longer segregated .and the new black middle class here has developed its own
tinsel-like, Piedmont chic style to show off its new found wealth." Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1980, at DC4,
col. 3.
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demonstrators picketed Greensboro's segregated facilities, demanding
equality. By the end of the decade, however, the non-violent era of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. gave way to the black power movement. No
longer content to work within the confines of the existing power structure,
Greensboro's young blacks accepted the black power movement's chal-
lenge to seize power from the white establishment. 2 ' Among those answer-
ing the call for increased militancy was Nelson Johnson, who would play
a prominent role in the "Death to the Klan" rally.
A native of eastern North Carolina, Johnson entered A & T State Uni-
versity in the fall of 1965. Capitalizing on his organizational skills and
fiery rhetoric, Johnson established himself as a militant force in campus
and city politics. He forged a coalition between students and the black
community in order to support striking A & T cafeteria workers who
were protesting alleged management exploitation. His name was also
linked to an armed insurgence which resulted in a stand-off between stu-
dents and law enforcement officials on the A & T campus in 1969.22
Johnson's advocacy of radical social change ultimately led him to become
a spokesman for the Communist Workers' Party (CWP).
Characterized as one of the smaller sects on the far left, the CWP was
a Maoist, anti-Soviet group, which had its origins in the civil rights, anti-
war, and women's movements of the sixties. The CWP proclaimed its
goals as:
- Workers' democratic control of factories and other work places,
and a national plan for coordinating production;
- Jobs at union-scale wages for everyone;
- National health and retirement insurance, free child care, free
education through college, and reduced housing and utility
costs;
- Dismantling military alliances and the systematic reduction of
arms worldwide.2
21 See W. CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 247.
2' The National Guard was called in to quell the demonstration and one student was killed.
Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1980, at DC4, col. 5.
'3 Interview with Lewis Pitts, plaintiffs' attorney, in Greensboro, N.C. (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter
Pitts interview).
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According to the CWP, racism and violence were the inevitable results
of capitalism, hence the Ku Klux Klan was the ultimate embodiment of
the capitalist class. The North Carolina Ku Klux Klan, one of the largest
in the nation,24 became a natural enemy and convenient target for the
CWP. The CWP labelled the Klan as "one of the most treacherous scum
elements produced by the dying system of capitalism" and exhorted CWP
members to "physically smash the racist KKK wherever it rears its ugly
head."25 Violence was narrowly averted in China Grove, North Carolina,
when the CWP disrupted a Klan recruiting rally and burned the Confed-
erate flag. Buoyed by their success in China Grove, the CWP challenged
Klansmen to attend a "Death to the Klan" rally in Greensboro. An open
letter, drafted by Nelson Johnson, warned that "the Klan will be
smashed.... Klanspeople, and your Nazi friends - you are a temporary
pest and an obstruction in our fight to end all exploitation and oppression.
But, we take you seriously and we will show you no mercy. DEATH TO
THE KLAN!!!" 213
Johnson's public challenge to the Klan drew the anticipated response
when Grand Dragon Virgil L. Griffin used the pulpit of a local church to
proclaim that communists were marching in the streets and church people
were letting them.27 At Griffin's prompting, the Klansmen reached a con-
sensus to join forces with the Nazi Party28 in order to present a united
racist front against the CWP. The Washington Post graphically described
the mentality of the groups preparing for confrontation:
24 The B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League estimated that North Carolina was home to some
800 Klan members. Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1980, at C5, col. 2. This estimate deals with six factions of
the Klan operating in North Carolina. Three representative factions were known as the White
Knights of Liberty, the United Klans of America, and the White Patriot Party (formerly the Confed-
erate Knights of the Ku Klux Klan). Although there were differences in ideology among the various
Klan factions, all advocated white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant supremacy. Id.
22 An Open Letter from the Workers Viewpoint Organization to Joe Grady, Gorrell Pierce, and
All KKK Members and Sympathizers (Oct. 22, 1979). The entire letter appears infra Appendix B.
28 Id.
27 Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 28, 1985, at D3, col. 1.
28 The Nazi "Party" may be a misnomer in light of the chaos within the organization. In 1958,
George Lincoln Rockwell formed the American Nazi Party based on the doctrines of German dictator
Adolf Hitler. Rockwell was killed in 1967 by a former follower. Without Rockwell's leadership the
party fragmented and withered. Several years later the National Socialist Party of America was
formed in Chicago. Harold Covington, a North Carolina native, assumed leadership and moved the
party headquarters to Raleigh, North Carolina. Covington disappeared in 1981, and the North Caro-
lina Nazi Party has dissolved into splinter groups. For a general history of the American Nazi Party,
see D. DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE (1985); D. HAMLIN, THE NAzu/SKoKIE CONFLICT (1980).
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The members of each group think they represent the true beliefs
of a majority of working class Americans. Each sees the other not as
an isolated group of extremists, but as the shock troops of a well-
organized conspiracy. Their separate passions and obsessions seem
to have driven them inexorably together, first to occupy the center of
each other's hatred and then to shed blood.2"
C. The Confrontation
On the day of the "Death to the Klan" rally, the Klansmen and Nazis
gathered outside Greensboro to form a motor caravan. Many of the par-
ticipants were boisterous and belligerent as they loaded rifles and semi-
automatic weapons into the trunks of several automobiles. Nearby in
Morningside Manor, a predominantly black housing project, preparations
were underway for the "Death to the Klan" rally. Demonstrators, dressed
in hardhats, jeans, and blue workshirts, made placards and set up a
speaker's platform on the back of a flatbed truck. A CWP member
strummed a guitar, leading a group of adults and children in protest
songs. The lyrics "People, people, have you heard, revolution is our
word" drifted through the midday air."0
The tranquility of the scene was shattered as a line of vehicles moved
up the street toward the demonstrators. The caravan of Klansmen and
Nazis was led by an automobile with a Confederate flag on its license
plate. As the vehicle approached the demonstrators, a passenger called out,
"You asked for the Klan, now you've got them."'" CWP members re-
turned the verbal taunt with cries of "Ku Klux Klan, scum of the land,"
as they began beating on the automobile with a stick. 2 Klan members
exited from their vehicles and initiated a scuffle. At some point a single
shot rang out, then the air exploded with the sound of gunfire and sticks
pounding against flesh and concrete. In eighty-eight seconds the massacre
was over. Four CWP members were killed instantly, a fifth died at the
hospital, and another was permanently paralyzed. 33 All but one of the
29 Wash. Post, June 22, 1980, at A17, col. 1.
30 Pitts interview, supra note 23.
*, Id. See also 88 Seconds in Greensboro (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 24, 1983).
32 Id. See also Wash. Post, June 22, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
22 The deceased were: Sandra Smith, 29, former student body president of Bennett College; Cae-
sar Cauce, 28, a Cuban refugee and a 1975 magna cum laude graduate of Duke Medical School;
Michael Nathan, 33, a 1973 graduate of Duke Medical School; and James Waller, 37, a graduate of
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victims were white, and all were dedicated revolutionaries who had given
up promising careers to support the CWP.
The victims of the violence were mostly northern whites in their late
twenties and early thirties who had been educated in some of the nation's
leading universities."' Four of the five slain CWP members were medical
school graduates. The widow of one victim proclaimed that her husband
became a radical when serving an internship at Lincoln Hospital in New
York. "It was like a part of the Third World," she explained. "He was
beginning to see that the whole system of capitalism was creating injuries
faster than he could put on Bandaids." a The disillusioned doctor moved
to North Carolina, studied Marxism, and joined the CWP. Reflecting his
view that a revolution would come from communist organization of the
working class, the- doctor abandoned his medical career and began work-
ing in Greensboro's non-unionized textile mills.
In contrast to their well-educated victims, the men who shot them were
mainly high school drop-outs. Most worked in the textile mills and all
professed to love America and hate communism. Grand Dragon Virgil
Griffin, who typified the Klansmen, explained that his membership in the
Klan came about because, "I have five kids, I'm a taxpayer, and I don't
like what's going on in the schools. They're takin' prayer and Bible out
and puttin' niggers and sex education in."13 6 Griffin claimed that the
Klansmen and Nazis "went down to Greensboro to fly the American flag
and say we believed in America and believed in God.""7
Another typical Klansman who participated in the demonstration was
Jerry Paul Smith, who had dropped out of the tenth grade, worked in
Greensboro's textile mills, drove a truck cross-country under the CB han-
dle "Southern Babymaker," and rode with a motorcycle gang. Tall,
heavy-set, with tattooed arms and a short temper, he lost two front teeth
in a fight and confessed that he has been "known to throw the first
the University of Chicago Medical School and a former professor at the Duke Medical School. Wil-
liam Sampson, 31, later died in the hospital. A native of Richmond, Virginia, Sampson attended the
Sorbonne, Harvard Divinity School, and the University of Virginia Medical School. Paul
Bermanzohn, a native New Yorker and a 1974 Duke Medical School graduate, survived his gunshot
wounds, but is permanently paralyzed. Pitts interview, supra note 23.
See supra note 33.
W5 ash. Post, June 22, 1980, at A17, col. 2.
36 Id. at A18, col. 2.
17 Id. at col. 3.
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punch.""8 He claimed that he did not know there was going to be a fight
in Greensboro, but insisted that "if you smack a man in the face with an
egg, you got to expect to get your butt whipped."' 9 Smith admitted that he
enjoyed the stick fighting at the rally until the guns came out. He also
conceded that, "It's a hell of a thing to see a man layin' there, gasping, the
life running out of him in the street, but that's what they intended to do to
us.")
4 0
Each side blamed the other for the outbreak of violence, but the factual
investigation of the November 3 event raised more questions than an-
swers. Who had fired the first shot? Why had the police not been present?
What role did state and federal law enforcement agencies play in the
events leading up to November 3? Was there a cover-up by the police?
Satisfactory answers to these questions have never emerged because confu-
sion seems to have reigned on the day of the massacre.
Reconstruction of the events of November 3 disclosed that the CWP
parade permit indicated that the march would begin at noon at Washing-
ton Street and Carver Drive. A different starting point, however, was
identified by posters advertising the march. According to police, efforts to
clear up the discrepancy with CWP members on the morning of Novem-
ber 3 prompted chants of "Death to the Pigs."'" Nelson Johnson warned
police to "stay out of our way," but later asserted that he had only in-
tended to caution police not to interfere with the rally. The police, how-
ever, charged that the CWP sought a confrontation and created a situation
where the police were trying to protect people who did not want them
around. After concluding that a show of force might result in unifying all
groups against the police, law enforcement authorities made a tactical de-
cision to keep a low profile. Officers assigned to monitor the march were
told "to grab a quick lunch and be in place by 11:30 a.m."4 When word
came that the Klan was moving earlier than anticipated, the police were
ordered to their pre-assigned positions, but the message came too late to
avoid tragedy.
'8 Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1980, at A2, col. 3.
Id. at Al, col. 2.
Id. at A2, col. 1.
4' Pitts interview, supra note 23.
42 Id.
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D. The Alleged Police Conspiracy
On the anniversary of the shootings, sixteen individuals, including
CWP members and relatives of the slain victims, filed suit against eighty-
seven defendants. The charges included wrongful death, assault and bat-
tery, and a claim that Klansmen and Nazis conspired with city, state, and
federal agents to violate the civil rights of those participating in the anti-
Klan rally.4 The conspiracy allegations focused on two key figures link-
ing state and federal officials in the conspiracy theory: Greensboro police
informant Eddie Dawson, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) agent Bernard Butkovich."
Dawson, described as a loner, had a long history of involvement with
the Klan. While serving time in prison for Klan-related activities, he was
recruited as an F'BI informant and worked undercover for several years.
As part of his undercover work, Dawson developed close contacts within
the Greensboro Police Department. When the police learned of the
CWP's plans for a "Death to the Klan" rally, they turned to Dawson as
their primary source of information on the Klan. Dawson renewed his
relationship with the Klan and assumed a leadership role in planning for
the November 3 rally. He designed a flyer that equated communists with
murderers, and lie spoke at a Klan meeting denouncing blacks and com-
munists. He admitted that he urged Klansmen to attend the upcoming
CWP march in Greensboro, while the CWP, as well as some Klansmen,
claimed that Dawson also used this occasion to encourage members to
bring guns to the rally.45
The night before the rally, Dawson obtained a copy of the CWP's
parade permit from his police contacts and drove Klansmen over the
parade route. The day of the rally, Dawson helped assemble Klansmen
" The Washington Post opined that there was "a feeling of kinship between city authorities and
the Klan." Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1980, at DC4, col. 3. The plaintiffs' charges consisted of: a conspiracy
to violate the plaintiffs' right to assemble, right to life, and right to equal protection of the laws, see 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1976); participation in the conspiracy by government officials, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1986 (1976), and a separate conspiracy to conceal the initial conspiracy, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985
(1976). Greensboro News & Record, May 19, 1985, at C3, cols. 1-2.
" Neither Butkovich nor Dawson was indicted or called to testify in the state criminal prosecu-
tion of Klansmen and Nazis. Tabb & Nathan, The View from N.C.: Civil Rights, the Klan & Rea-
gan Justice, THE NAnON, Aug. 21, 1982, at 141.
" In the course of his interview for the public television documentary 88 Seconds in Greens-
boro, Dawson denied that he encouraged the use of firearms.
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and Nazis at the home of a fellow Klansman. On two separate occasions,
Dawson broke away from the group to telephone Jerry "Rooster"
Cooper, who was his contact within the Greensboro police department.
Dawson advised Cooper that approximately fifteen Klan and Nazi mem-
bers had gathered for the rally and that many had brought guns.46 As
11:00 a.m. approached, Dawson joined Grand Dragon Virgil Griffin in
the lead car and started the caravan moving. Police Officer Cooper re-
mained several blocks behind while radioing a warning that the group had
begun to move. The police, however, missed two key transmissions from
Cooper advising that the caravan was heading in the direction of Carver
Drive rather than toward the planned origination point. When shots rang
out, officer Cooper was still a block away.
Bernard Butkovich, the other undercover agent who allegedly played an
active role in planning the events of November 3, was not in Greensboro
for the rally. Butkovich became involved with the Nazi party in July 1979
when the BATF sent him to North Carolina to infiltrate the party and
investigate the group's possession of illegal weapons. The BATF, how-
ever, ordered agent Butkovich to stay away from the "Death to the Klan"
rally because it was too "public."4 While Butkovich avoided the rally
itself, he participated in planning for the confrontation when Klansmen
met with Nazis and extended the invitation to join forces.48 At the meet-
ing, Butkovich was alleged to have encouraged the Nazis to bring guns to
the November 3 demonstration. One participant at the meeting recalls
Butkovich stating, "Well, I wouldn't go unless I had my gun. It isn't
against the law to have one locked in the car."49 At trial, Butkovich testi-
fied that he might have encouraged the Nazis to produce their illegal
weapons in order to facilitate seizure by the authorities.50 Butkovich and
other BATF agents, however, insisted that they believed the Nazis when
46 In describing the scene at trial, former Nazi leader Roland Wayne Wood testified that there
were enough guns at the house to look like they were "preparing for war." Pitts interview, supra note
23. 4 Greensboro News & Record, May 9, 1985, at C2, col. 5.
" The meeting was held in Winston-Salem in a garage belonging to Roland Wayne Wood.
Wood was under investigation for illegally owning a fully automatic weapon, and was considered by
Winston-Salem police to be one of the most dangerous men in the area. Pitts interview, supra note
23. 49 Garrow, The Greensboro Boys: Klan and State in North Carolina, THE NATION, Aug. 6,
1983, at 107 (quoting comment made by Nazi defendant Raeford Milano Caudle).
50 See Greensboro News & Record, May 19, 1985, at C3, col. 4.
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they stated that they would not take firearms to the rally. The BATF also
denied allegations that it informed other law enforcement agencies of the
Nazis' planned participation in the confrontation with the CWP.
The third law enforcement branch to be implicated in the alleged con-
spiracy was the FBI.5' Having learned in October, 1979 of the "Death to
the Klan" rally, the agency launched an investigation of the CWP. Ac-
cording to the FBI, however, the rally was not the focus of its investiga-
tion, nor were any FBI agents involved in local law enforcement planning
for the November 3 event. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs argued that the FBI
had sufficient warning of the potential for violence in Greensboro and
should have taken preventive measures. In support of their allegations, the
plaintiffs introduced evidence that the leader of the Winston-Salem, North
Carolina KKK had advised FBI agents that, after the flag-burning inci-
dent in China Grove, there would be violence if the CWP and the Klan
ever met again. As part of his undercover work, Ed Dawson had warned
an FBI agent that certain dangerous individuals were coming to the "com-
mie rally." 2 The local U.S. Attorney also revealed that several FBI
agents informed him that there might be trouble at the anti-Klan rally.
Despite such information, the FBI characterized its investigation of the
CWP as "nothing urgent."'5' At trial, Judge Merhige questioned such a
characterization while pointing to an FBI memorandum predicting that
the "Death to the Klan" rally "involves or will involve the use of force or
violence."' 54 Merhige observed that the memorandum was issued less than
two weeks before the demonstration and asked why the FBI took no ac-
tion. The chief of Greensboro's FBI office conceded, "Yes, I should have
given it more priority.) 55
The allegations of government agencies actively or passively bringing
about the Greensboro confrontation suggested for the first time in almost a
decade that government undercover agents may have been involved with
an extremist group involved in violence. In 1974 The New York Times
"' At the funeral march for the slain victims, the CWP issued a new explanation of the shootout:
"On November 3, 1979, under the direction and aid of the FBI and the rest of the overt repressive
machinery of the capitalistic state, the KKK and Nazis with military precision assassinated five mem-
bers of the Communist Workers' Party . . . ." Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1980, at C5, col. 4.
5' Greensboro News & Record, May 19, 1985, at 03, col. 6.
8' Greensboro News & Record, May 15, 1985, at B2, col. 3.
64 Id.
15 Id.
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had reported a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation" ' designed
to harass and discredit political extremists, including members of the
Communist Party, the Ku Klux Klan, militant black organizations, and
the antiwar movement. Disclosure of the government's infiltration of do-
mestic political groups prompted the impaneling of an investigatory com-
mission chaired by then Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.57 The Rocke-
feller commission documented a history of the government's "plainly
unlawful" conduct and recommended significant restrictions on domestic
surveillance.5" Many of the commission's recommendations were codified
in the National Security Act. 9 The Greensboro plaintiffs charged that the
FBI and BATF had violated the National Security Act's strict guidelines
for federal agents engaged in undercover operations.
The allegations of governmental misconduct as well as the other issues
raised by the plaintiffs' federal suit were not resolved for four years in
order to provide state authorities and the Justice Department an opportu-
nity to prosecute criminal charges against individual Klansmen and Nazis.
The state and federal trials resulted in the Klansmen and Nazis being
acquitted by all-white juries."0 The CWP blamed the acquittals on gov-
ernment prosecutors whom they accused of concealing the government
conspiracy. Other observers pointed out, however, that CWP members re-
fused to testify or cooperate with the prosecutors."1 In response to such
criticism, the CWP announced that it would utilize the federal civil rights
suit to present its side of the story. "What got presented to the two previ-
ous juries is a skewed view of the entire civil rights conspiracy," plaintiffs'
counsel declared. "We're going to present a complete picture of it." 2 A
N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, § 1, col. 1.
' See Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933 (1975).
's See COMMISSION ON C.I.A. AcTivrriEs WrrnN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, at 10 (1975).
59 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-05 (1982). For current provisions, see generally Note, Executive Order
12,333: "Unleashing" the CIA Violates the Leash Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 968 (1985).
"0 The defendants were acquitted in state criminal proceedings on November 17, 1980, and in
federal proceedings on April 15, 1984. Taylor, supra note 1. See also A Litany of "Not Guilty":
Klansmen and Nazis are Freed in Greensboro Killings, TIME, Dec. 1, 1980, at 25.
"' Nelson Johnson issued a news release stating that "We reject this whole fascist judicial pro-
ceeding. We reject it completely, thoroughly, unconditionally." Wash. Post, June 17, 1980, at A6, col.
5. A juror at the criminal trial subsequently stated that "The CWP really missed the boat. They
should have testified. They would have helped us understand .... " Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1980, at
A2, col. 2.
.'2 Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 3.
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Greensboro defense attorney in the criminal trials warned that, "I expect
all of the Communists to come out of the closet and testify to things they
never testified to before. That ought to make for quite a difference in the
[civil] trial.""3
E. The Civil Rights Trial
The long-awaited trial was further delayed when the North Carolina
federal judges disqualified themselves from presiding over the case. Judge
Merhige, who over the years has been consistently tapped to handle some
of this country's most difficult cases, was appointed to try the case in De-
cember, 1983. One attorney explained Merhige's selection:
He is very sharp and loves the law. He will use his personality and
friendship to move you where he wants to have you. I think that's
why he is put in these controversial cases. When they figure there
will be a bunch of rowdy and radical lawyers, they want an
ironman like Merhige in the courtroom. He'll throw them in jail if
necessary to move the case along."'
Merhige willingly accepted the challenge to handle this potentially vol-
atile case while expressing only one reservation. Faced with adjudicating a
dispute between Klansmen, Nazis, and Communists, Merhige quipped,
"The only thing I'm afraid of is that somebody might come out of [the
case] saying they like me.""5
Shortly after his appointment, Merhige travelled to North Carolina to
rule on pretrial motions and to set the date for trial. His law clerk accom-
panied him and recalls that the first courtroom hearing was attended by
litigants who indicated that they intended to use the trial as a forum for
their political views. The Nazis appeared at the hearing in military boots,
brown shirts, and other vestiges of the Nazi uniform. The Klansmen en-
gaged in less courtroom bravado, but were equally adamant in denouncing
blacks, Jews, and communists. Despite their openly racist views, Mer-
hige's clerk expressed sympathy for the Klansmen "because they seemed
to be poor working folks bred into racism as an outlet for life's
" Id. at col. 1. Today, civil rights litigators have increasingly filed financial damage suits against
the Klan. See Curriden, Hitting the Klan - Civilly, 75 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1989, at 19.
* Pitts interview, supra note 23.
66 Interview with Ann Holton, Merhige's former clerk, in Richmond, Va. (Oct. 3, 1986).
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frustrations.""8
When Merhige convened the first hearing, a Klansman arose to com-
plain that he could not hear anything that was being said in the court-
room. "Why don't you come up and sit by me?" offered Merhige, putting
the man in the jury box next to him. According to Merhige's clerk, the
incident typified the judge's handling of volatile and politically outspoken
litigants. "Judge Merhige has a real good way with pro se defendants,"
the clerk explained. "He makes them feel so at ease. He listens to them,
lets them know they've been listened to, just makes them feel comfortable
and better about having their day in court. It's a characteristic that makes
the whole system work better."'67
Although the hard-of-hearing Klansman was delighted with his front-
row seat, the federal marshals were alarmed over the potential security
threat posed by the Klansman's proximity to Merhige. The marshals'
concern for tight security had been prompted by a Nazi bomb threat68 and
a scuffle between police and CWP members during the state criminal pro-
ceedings. A full-time bodyguard was assigned to Merhige, and the judge
was forced to forego his evening stroll and early morning jog. A SWAT
team patrolled the roof of the courthouse; only federal marshals were al-
lowed to carry weapons into the courtroom. Weapons belonging to FBI
agents and other police authorities were surrendered at the courthouse
door. Firearms to be used as exhibits in the case were checked and
rechecked as Merhige warned, "I don't even want a spitball in them."6 9
All cameras and recording devices were likewise barred from the court-
room. Unlike the judges in the prior criminal prosecutions, however, Mer-
hige did not impose a gag order prohibiting the parties from taking their
political agendas to the press. The CWP, employing a full-time media
specialist, took advantage of this opportunity to further its cause with the
public. The CWP insisted that media coverage was needed to educate
people about the trial and the government's involvement in the shootings,
66 Id.
67 Id.
"' Several individuals were prosecuted as a result of these threats. For the background and dispo-
sition of these prosecutions see United States v. Caudle, 758 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Talbert, 706 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1983).
"' Merhige interview, supra note 11.
1989] 1159
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
particularly in light of the allegedly biased news coverage of the CWP.70
Counsel for the City of Greensboro, however, complained to Judge Mer-
hige that "I can't turn on the radio going back and forth to work without
hearing what some plaintiffs have said about one of the court's rulings...
. We defendants.., have been bombarded and spoken ill of from day one.
But we've kept our mouths shut. We want to try this case in a court of
law."" In response, Merhige acknowledged, "I must say they [the CWP]
have the right to do it. But it takes away from the appearance of jus-
tice." 7 2 Merhige cautioned the parties against trying their case on the
sidewalk, but never took any action against plaintiffs' lawyers for critical
remarks made to the press.
The lawyers who spoke to the media were often as colorful and unor-
thodox as their clients. The plaintiffs' lawyers were led by Lewis Pitts of
the Christic Institute, an ecumenical center for public policy and public
interest law based in Washington, D.C. Born and raised in South Caro-
lina, Pitts is a political activist who has devoted his career to defending
people and causes in which he believes. After graduating from law school,
he worked as a public defender before opening his own office in a
predominantly black, rural county of South Carolina. His representation
of economically disadvantaged plaintiffs in civil rights cases brought him
little remuneration and he was eventually forced to dissolve his practice.
He then became involved in the anti-nuclear movement and worked for
attorney Gerry Spence in the Karen Silkwood litigation. Pitts also organ-
ized and participated in civil disobedience protesting nuclear power.7 1
When the Silkwood case ended in 1979, Pitts was asked to assume re-
sponsibility for the Greensboro case and to generate publicity for the
plaintiffs' cause. Prior to Pitts' arrival, the initial legal effort was
spearheaded by the Greensboro Justice Fund, which was formed primar-
ily by the family and friends of slain CWP members. The group was
closely associated with communism and generated little public sympathy.
By disbanding the group and replacing it with the Greensboro Civil
Rights Fund, Pitts sought to form a broad-based coalition of support for
the plaintiffs. The new organization was successful in drawing support
70 Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 22, 1985, at C2, cols. 4-5.
, Id. at col. 4.
72 Merhige interview, supra note 11.
'3 Pitts interview, supra note 23.
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from the National ACLU and various religious organizations.74
Throughout the Greensboro trial, Pitts led a team of social-activist law-
yers who entered into a stormy relationship with the judge. According to
Pitts, "We had a very hostile relation with Judge Merhige for a while.
He put a lot of pressure on at first and just beat the hell out of us. Later
he came off the bench and admitted that he had tried to push the case too
much. He backed off a bit and slowed down."7 5
While the plaintiffs' attorneys were self-avowed social activists, several
of the defense counsel were equally adamant about the political aspects of
the case. The City of Greensboro was represented by a team of local at-
torneys led by an ardent anti-communist. On several occasions he re-
sponded to the plaintiffs' allegations by declaring: "But, Your Honor,
these ... these people are,... well, they're communists." Judge Merhige
would merely smile and reply, "Well, that's paragraph one of the com-
plaint. Can we go on?"
17 6
While the plaintiffs focused their attention upon the alleged conspiracy
of federal and state law enforcement agents, individual Klansmen and Na-
zis were also named as defendants in the civil rights suit. Five of the
individual defendants claimed indigency, and Merhige requested that the
Greensboro bar donate their legal services to the defendants. 7 When no
volunteers came forward, the local bar's reluctance to be associated with
either political fringe group was parodied in an advertisement in the local
newspaper:
Wanted: Energetic attorneys to represent . . . indigent Nazi-
Klansmen named conspirators in a $48 million lawsuit. Trial lasts
two months, trial preparation even longer. Needed immediately.
Overtime work and out-of-town travel required. No benefits. No
pay.7 8
Merhige failed to see the humor in the situation and assembled the lead-
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Interview with Gerard Chapman, defense counsel, in Greensboro, N.C. (Sept. 1986) [herein-
after Chapman interview].
" There is no statutory authority for a federal district court to require an unwilling attorney to
represent an indigent in a civil action. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989). The
court's inherent power to do so is unclear. Id. at 1823.
" Chapman interview, supra note 76.
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ing partners from the area's largest law firms. He threatened that either
they provide a solution to his dilemma or he would. The law firms reluc-
tantly agreed to make financial contributions to the indigents' defense, and
two young lawyers came forward to represent the Klan and Nazi
defendants.
Larry I. Moore, a former member of the NAACP, was assigned to
handle the Nazis' defense, while Gerard M. Chapman was given respon-
sibility for the Klansmen. When asked how he felt about representing his
avowedly racist clients, Chapman replied, "It was hard to separate the
people from the issues. I mentioned to one of the Nazis that I was in a
Jewish fraternity in college. I'm still surprised the fellow doesn't have a
slipped disc from the double take he did. But once I got to know the
defendants as people, I focused on my obligation to give them the best
representation I could."" 9
With the lawyers in place, Merhige sought to step up the pace of the
proceedings. At the first meeting of counsel, the judge announced that the
trial would start promptly at 8:30 a.m. every day and continue until noon
when the jury would be dismissed for a one-hour lunch period. During
the luncheon period, Merhige and the lawyers would attend to procedural
matters. The trial would resume at 1:00 p.m. and continue until 6:00 p.m.
Any motions to be argued by counsel would be heard after the jury was
dismissed for the evening. One attorney discounted Merhige's proposed
timetable as a bluff because it was obvious that such a schedule could not
be maintained. To his surprise, the attorney discovered that Merhige was
very aggressive in exercising control of the case, and that the judge would
do whatever was necessary to hasten the pace of the proceedings. "Al-
though," the lawyer concedes, "Judge Merhige never asked the lawyers to
do something he wouldn't do. He met all the deadlines himself and he
worked nonstop, including weekends."80
Merhige initially announced that trial would begin within four months,
but he relented when the lawyers' protested that additional time was re-
quired for pretrial preparations. Subsequent requests for additional con-
tinuances were brushed aside when Merhige promised: "The trial date is
79 Id.
8O Id.
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not being moved unless the good Lord takes this federal judge's life.""'
The plaintiffs called a press conference to criticize the judge's "rush to
judgment" attitude as a threat to the fundamental principle of fairness
under the law.82
F. The Discovery Process
Much of the pretrial delay, which not even an "activist" trial judge
could avoid, was necessitated by extensive discovery motions. The plain-
tiffs insisted that investigation of a government conspiracy and coverup
was akin to the process of peeling an onion: "When one layer of evidence
is exposed, it leads to yet another layer that must be untangled."8 Mer-
hige, however, characterized the case as the most over-discovered case he
had seen in his life. Klansman Ed Dawson's deposition alone took more
than three days, which an irate Merhige characterized as bordering on the
ridiculous. "If you can't get what you want out of a witness in two or
three days, you don't have much to begin with," Merhige fumed. "You're
never going to find out, and you're wasting your time." '84 The judge
warned that he would impose a substantial fine on the responsible attor-
ney if there were any duplicate questions in the typed transcript of Daw-
son's deposition. Merhige also questioned the number of documents
needed by plaintiffs' attorneys, saying, "[t]he more documents you have,
the more confusing the case will be .... I'm here to try and narrow the
scope of this thing - not widen it." 5
The sheer volume of paperwork proved to be staggering, as over
100,000 pages of pleadings and documents were lodged with the clerk's
office in Greensboro.8" The papers were bound in twenty volumes, packed
in eight cardboard boxes, and transported to the federal courthouse in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where the case was tried. In addition,
there were one hundred depositions, most over a hundred pages long, and
numerous documents not made public pursuant to court order. Merely
keeping track of the contents of the documents proved to be a difficult
81 Merhige interview, supra note 11.
82 Pitts interview, supra note 23.
8' Id.
8 Merhige interview, supra note 11.
85 Id.
' Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 3, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
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undertaking. On one occasion, when plaintiffs' lawyers asked the govern-
ment to provide a document for examination, the exasperated Justice De-
partment lawyer declared, "They have it, they just don't know they have
it.",87
Efforts to organize the documentary evidence, combined with the pres-
sure of Merhige's time constraints, caused tempers to flare as cooperation
among counsel dwindled. The judge was forced to schedule numerous pre-
trial hearings to resolve disputes among the parties. At one hearing, Judge
Merhige chastised an attorney with the Justice Department for the length
of time it was taking the FBI to produce court-ordered documents. "We
haven't had the speediest action out of Washington .... What's the prob-
lem?" Merhige asked. "Don't those guys work after 5 o'clock?" The at-
torney responded, "The FBI has told us that, as these things go, this has
gone relatively fast." Merhige merely sighed, "We're all in trouble."88
G. Jury Selection
In addition to delays caused by pretrial discovery, the process of select-
ing a jury proved to be an arduous task.8" The previous acquittals from
all-white juries convinced the plaintiffs that jury composition would be
crucial to their case. 90 On July 2, 1984, the plaintiffs asked to suspend
trial proceedings on grounds that the jury plan in effect in North Carolina
substantially underrepresented blacks.9" When Merhige denied the re-
quest, the plaintiffs asked for permission to appeal the decision to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Numerous black and religious affiliated
organizations filed amicus briefs in support of the motion.9 2 Merhige,
however, ignored the protests and began jury selection with an extensive
voir dire requiring each prospective juror to reveal his opinion of the liti-
gants, racial issues, and governmental use of undercover agents.
"' Id. at col. 3. The FBI reported that it had spent S60,000 tracking down and making docu-
ments available for plaintiffs. Id.
s8 Id. at col. 2.
89 Nearly 300 prospective jurors were examined to produce a six-person jury, Taylor, supra
note 1, at 149.
" Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 22, 1985, at 02, cols. 1-2.
91 Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942 (M.D.N.C. 1984). Plaintiffs claimed that the Middle
District's plan of using questionnaires to cull "unqualified, exempted, or excused" persons from the
qualified jury list resulted in underrepresentation of blacks on juries. Id. at 945.
92 Taylor, supra note 1, at 149.
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Although jury selection required 129 interviews over a period of nine
days and involved serious consideration of racial and political attitudes,
Merhige was able to ease the tensions with humor. On one occasion, the
judge pressed a potential juror to determine whether her political beliefs
would cause her to favor one of the litigants. When the woman failed to
comprehend the question, the judge continued:
"Let me put it this way. If one of the plaintiffs and one of the de-
fendants went fishing together and stopped by your house to tell you
about the big fish that they caught, who would you believe?"
The woman paused a moment and said, "I don't really think they'd
go fishing together, Your Honor."
"Assume that they did," Merhige pleaded.
"Well," the woman replied, "I guess if either of them caught a fish,
I guess either of them could tell some truth about it.""5
Another middle-aged white woman informed Merhige that she would
rather see her daughter marry a "Southern gentleman" than a black.
Merhige asked if she would allow her daughter to marry a man from
New York. Upon receiving a negative response, the judge smiled, "My
wife didn't mind marrying a New Yorker. Do you really think the South
is going to rise again?"9
Throughout the jury selection process, both sides charged that Merhige
was too lenient in qualifying jurors for the other side. According to the
plaintiffs, "There's a presumption that blacks have a bias toward the
Klan that they can't overcome. They get grilled for an hour-and-a-half
and get all the tricky questions."95 The same standard, they contended,
was not being applied to prospective white jurors. The plaintiffs com-
plained that Merhige went "so far out of his way to be tolerant of the
Klan" '9 that the panel was likely to be composed of jurors partial to the
defendants. Such leniency was said to be exemplified by the court's accept-
ance of a woman who claimed that she could be impartial even though her
son was a member of the Klan and she had a casual acquaintance with
two other members of the Klan and the American Nazi Party.9 ' While
9C Chapman interview, supra note 76.
", Merhige interview, supra note 11.
95 Id.
" Pitts interview, supra note 23.
o The juror said that she knew little about the Klan, never discussed it with her son, and would
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the plaintiffs charged that Merhige favored jurors with ties to the Klan,
the defendants voiced concerns that Merhige displayed an excessive zeal to
seat black jurors." Each side began jury selection convinced that Merhige
was biased against their side. By the conclusion of the jury selection pro-
cess, both sides had agreed that the judge was biased against everyone.
The jury pool approved by Merhige consisted of forty-three jurors, nine
of whom were black. Convinced that an impartial trial jury could not be
selected from the pool, the plaintiffs renewed an earlier motion seeking to
move the trial out of North Carolina. 9 They asserted that the media's all-
encompassing coverage of events was highly prejudicial and would neces-
sarily influence jurors, nearly all of whom admitted that they were famil-
iar with the case. In an impassioned courtroom speech, one of the plain-
tiffs' attorneys predicted the impanelment of yet a third all-white jury.
While the attorney spoke, Merhige quickly reviewed the memorandum
presented in support of the plaintiffs' motion. As he did so, his jaw visibly
tightened. Looking up, Merhige interrupted counsel, and complained that
counsel's motion contained no law to support the plaintiffs' position. "You
people seldom give me any authority - any legal authority," Merhige
snapped. "All you people give me is argument, argument, argument. I
need cases. I've done more research on this thing than you have. That's
not fair. . . .I don't want to embarrass you, but it's almost as if you
people have never used the law library."' 00 Undeterred, counsel replied
that the Constitution was his authority.' 0'
Merhige denied the change of venue motion, but took steps to insure
that an all-white jury was not selected. He employed a method of exercis-
ing peremptory challenges which precluded the defendants from striking
all blacks from the pool.'0 2 The jury ultimately selected consisted of five
whites and one black, who was appointed foreman.
render an impartial verdict. Id.
8 Chapman interview, supra note 76.
Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
"o Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 22, 1985, at C2, cols. 2, 3.
'0' Plaintiffs' original venue motion contained numerous references to case law, which, according
to the plaintiff, reflected three weeks of legal research.
'02 There were nine blacks in the pool of 43 prospective jurors and the defendants had been'
accorded a total of ten peremptory challenges. Judge Merhige's restraints on the use of peremptory
challenges pre-dated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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H. Civil Rights Counterclaims
In addition to the delays caused by jury selection, the pace of the pro-
ceedings was slowed by the Klan and Nazi defendants' submission of
counterclaims for over $40 million in damages. The counterclaims alleged
that the CWP conspired to deprive Klan and Nazi members of their
rights to free speech, assemblage, and travel, as well as their right to ade-
quate police protection against unprovoked attacks." 3 According to the
defendants, the CWP's "Death to the Klan" campaign was motivated by
an anti-Christian, anti-white animus.
Although the Klansmen and Nazis failed to base their counterclaims on
any particular federal statute, they unwittingly placed themselves within
the protection of the federal Ku Klux Klan Act. 04 Passed as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, the law was designed to protect newly-en-
franchised blacks against racial terror promoted by the Klan and similar
groups. The Greensboro case was the first time Klansmen had ever at-
tempted to use the Civil Rights Act for their own benefit. The irony of the
situation weighed heavily on plaintiffs' counsel Lewis Pitts, who tele-
phoned defense counsel Jerry Chapman to argue that it was immoral to
use the anti-Klan statute to protect the Klan. Pitts accused Chapman of
going beyond "proper lawyering,"' ' but Chapman refused to accept criti-
cism for representing his clients' interests.'0 6
In the courtroom, plaintiffs' counsel vigorously opposed the counter-
claims as a subversion of the Congressional intent underlying passage of
the Civil Rights Act.'0 When Merhige authorized the counterclaims, the
plaintiffs' lawyers called a press conference to announce that the decision
was "outrageous" and that the judge was engaging in "judicial trail blaz-
ing."10 8 Plaintiffs' counsel Flint Taylor stated, "I've been litigating under
the Act for 15 years now. In all my travels and research, I've never seen
such a distortion of the use of this act."' 09 Merhige's ruling also drew
03 Waller v. Butkovich, 605 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-43 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
104 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
'0' Pitts interview, supra note 23.
... Chapman interview, supra note 76.
107 According to the plaintiffs, the law under which Klan/Nazi members were proceeding was
designed to prevent animus against "traditionally disadvantaged classes," not animus against Chris-
tians or anti-communists. Waller v. Butkovich, 605 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
108 Greensboro News & Record, Mar. 17, 1985, at Cl, col. 5.
109 Id.
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criticism from the National Black Leadership Roundtable, a group com-
posed of more than 200 national black organizations, including the
NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. A Round-
table spokesman expressed the feeling that "injustice has prevailed when
the Klan is allowed to sue for damages against the ones who died at their
hands."110 Additional criticism came from the Chairman of the Congres-
sional Black Caucus, who declared that "the Klan is playing some manip-
ulative gymnastics with the law and we just don't like that. . . . If the
judge had the right to do what he said, that represents a loophole in the
law." 11
Legal scholars, however, supported Merhige's ruling that the language
of the Civil Rights Act does not limit its protection to blacks. "It is cer-
tainly not true that [the Act] can only be invoked by black persons or Klan
victims," said Professor William Van Alstyne, a constitutional law scholar
at Duke University. "It is couched in universal terms. This statute is good
for everyone.""' 2 Defense counsel Larry Moore also defended Merhige's
decision on grounds that, "when you start trying to decide who can be
protected by the laws and who can't, aren't you supporting a type of legal
process that this law was designed to prevent in the first place?"" 83
Merhige, who was attacked as a judicial activist for his liberal stance in
school integration cases," 4 now found himself portrayed as a strict con-
structionist willing to apply the letter of the law with complete disregard
for moral and ethical concerns. In response to the criticism, the judge is-
sued a lengthy opinion explaining his conclusion that the Constitution's
equal protection clause and first amendment right of association would not
permit Congress to exclude the Klan or similar organizations from invok-
ing the protections of the Civil Rights Act. Merhige accepted the Civil
Rights Act on its face and refused to enter a thicket of speculation as to
legislative intent. He observed that:
It may be that when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871 it
did not foresee that situations would arise in which violent attacks
were directed at Klan members. But this does not mean that Con-
"Q Id. at C5, col. 3.
I d. at C1, col. 3.
. Id. at col. 4.
' Id. at col. 5; id. at C5, col. 2.
n See generally Bacigal & Bacigal, supra note 14.
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gress intended, as a per se matter, to exclude members of the Klan
and similar organizations from the protection of the Act .... Plain-
tiffs provide no authority, in the form of legislative history or other-
wise, that suggests that Congress intended such a limitation . ... 5
The plaintiffs regarded Merhige's ruling as an important psychological
victory for the Klan. According to the plaintiffs, recognizing the counter-
claims gave the court's stamp of approval to the Klansmen's contention
that they were the victims of a communist attack. The Klan's procedural
victory, however, was short-lived because Merhige subsequently ruled that
the counterclaims would be tried before a separate jury. Defense counsel
Gerard Chapman complained that Merhige had outmaneuvered the Klan
with a tactical ploy which recognized the validity of the counterclaims, but
prevented the jury from learning that the counterclaims had some rele-
vance to this case. Had the counterclaims gone to the jury along with the
CWP's claims, Chapman believes that the defendants could have taken
the offensive and shifted the blame to the CWP."' Under Merhige's rul-
ing, the Klan and Nazi defendants were left in a wholly defensive
position.
L The Evidentiary Hearing
The resolution of the counterclaims marked the end of pretrial legal
maneuvering. The trial on the merits of the case began on March 25,
1985 before a packed courtroom. The first witness called was a Durham
television cameraman who used videotapes and elaborate exhibits to re-
construct the events of November 3. In order to insure visibility of the
videotapes, monitors were strategically placed about the courtroom, one at
each counsel table, two before the jury, and one each before the judge and
the witness. Seeing his courtroom transformed into a viewing studio with
wires snaked across the floor, Judge Merhige admonished plaintiffs' coun-
sel that even though he knew it was necessary, he really wanted "to get
this stuff out of here as quickly as possible."'11 7 Although Merhige pro-
fesses to hate modern technology and still fumes over push-button tele-
phones, it was the judge who made the most effective use of the electronic
equipment. When a witness testified that he was unsure of the weapons
1,' Waller v. Butkovich, 605 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
116 Chapman interview, supra note 76.
"" Pitts interview, supra note 23.
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possessed by a defendant, the newsreel footage of the scene was played for
the jury. Merhige barked instructions like a movie director: "Stop the ac-
tion! Rewind! Play-back! Rewind, again. Now play-back in slow-motion.
Freeze it there!" On the screen the jury could see the defendant with a
gun in each hand." 8
When the electronic equipment was removed from the courtroom, the
plaintiffs offered eight weeks of testimony involving seventy-five witnesses.
A pattern evolved of first calling a plaintiff and then a Klan or Nazi
defendant. Through this interposition of plaintiffs' and defense witnesses,
the jury was able to focus on the starkly contrasting political beliefs of the
litigants. The demeanor of the witnesses also served as a dramatic expres-
sion of political extremism.
One of the most flamboyant witnesses was Roland Wayne Wood, who
had been acquitted of murder and conspiracy in the earlier criminal tri-
als." 9 "The more they try me, the meaner I get," Wood declared. "I'm
tired. I'm fed up. I've been charged twice before and found not guilty. Not
one of them [(communists)] has had to answer for a single thing they did
that day." 2 According to Wood, his first amendment rights were violated
by communists who attacked him on a public street. He claimed that he
acted in self-defense by firing his 12-gauge shotgun at people who were
aiming weapons at him. Wood complained of continuing harassment by
the communists and disclosed that he had been evicted from his home
because the landlord was afraid that the communists would burn it down.
As a result, Wood declared, he was living in the back seat of a car.
By the time of his testimony, Wood had left the Nazi Party and turned
to religion. He claimed to have earned a master's degree from a nationally
known bible college and was working on his doctorate. However, he re-
mained adamantly opposed to racial mixing and communism. "I'm a ra-
cist," he asserted, "the Bible teaches it," pointing to Genesis: 1 which says
"Each after his own." "As for communists," Wood sneered, they are "op-
118 Id.
11 Wood was charged in state court with five counts of first-degree murder and one count of
engaging in a riot in connection with the November 3 incident. He was charged in federal court with
five counts of conspiracy resulting in injury and one count of conspiracy resulting in death. Greens-
boro News & Record, Mar. 14, 1985, at D1, col. 2.
120 Id.
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posed to the ideals of freedom."12'
In addition to his belligerent testimony, Wood projected a defiant de-
meanor to the jury. A strapping 6-foot 2 inches, 285 pounds, Wood's at-
tire contrasted sharply with the lawyers' three-piece suits. 22 The first day
of trial, Wood appeared dressed in jeans and an olive-drab T-shirt with
the slogan "Eat lead, you lousy Red" encircling a figure in army fatigues
spraying automatic weapon fire. The next day, he wore a grey T-shirt
emblazoned with a Confederate flag and the slogan "Lee surrendered, I
didn't." On another occasion, he appeared dressed in a three-piece navy
blue suit with white tennis shoes, dark glasses, a Confederate flag pin,
and five small skull pins on his left breast pocket. According to Wood, the
pins represented the five times his civil rights were violated by the com-
munists. When a plaintiffs' attorney asked whether the pins represented
the five communists who died, Wood denied it. Upon further questioning,
Wood began singing, to the tune of Jingle Bells, a song about gassing
Jews. 12
3
As additional evidence unfolded, the Klansmen's propensity for carrying
weapons became apparent. During one exchange with a Klan defendant,
a plaintiffs' attorney asked: "Isn't it true, no one really threatened you at
China Grove?"
Witness: You have got to be kidding!
Counsel repeated the question.
Witness: That weren't no group of civil rights
marchers with love in their hearts.
Counsel: Did Joe Grady (Imperial Dragon) have a gun at
China Grove?
Witness: Well, he had his pants on so I reckon he had
a gun.
Counsel then questioned the witness about his own cache of firearms.
Witness: I just love guns!' 24
121 Id. at col. 4.
,21 Id. at col. 2.
123 Pitts interview, supra note 23.
124 Chapman interview, supra note 76.
1989] 1171
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
On another occasion, a Klansman testified, "I always take my guns. You
never know who might knock you in the head." Merhige interrupted the
questioning, asking, "Do you take them to church?" The witness replied,
"No, I take them if I go out of town. Guns are hard to replace, Your
Honor."125
In addition to serving as witnesses, several defendants acted as their
own lawyers and proved to be adept questioners. Virgil Griffin, Grand
Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, is a diminutive man, but according to the
lawyers, Griffin learned to "hit home runs on cross-examination."26
When Griffin was given an opportunity to interrogate a plaintiff, Griffin
fired off a question that the lawyers had carefully avoided: "You're a com-
munist and you advocate the violent overthrow of the U.S. government,
don't you?" The plaintiff replied, "Yes." Griffin sat down quietly, having
established the essence of his defense.
127
As the trial dragged on, Merhige voiced concern over many needless
and repetitious questions. "I've jurors here asking how much longer, how
much longer," Merhige complained. "You're taking advantage of it [the
judicial system] to the detriment of your clients." 12 Threatening to place
a time limit on plaintiffs' presentation of evidence, Merhige scolded plain-
tiffs' counsel Lewis Pitts: "You'd better hurry up or you'll be only half-
way through your case when I declare this trial is over.' 1 29 According to
Pitts, "When Merhige threatened that he would close the case ... if we
weren't finished, we didn't know if he would do it or not, with his temper.
It does a number on your head, and he works that - yelling and scream-
ing at you. He's an intimidating guy."130
Merhige escalated the pressure on counsel by charging that the plain-
tiffs had failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence against some of the
sixty defendants. "I'm glad I wasn't driving through Greensboro on No-
vember 3, 1979," the judge quipped, "because I guess I'd have been sued
too." On numerous occasions, the judge threatened to order the plaintiffs
to pay legal expenses for any defendant against whom no credible evi-
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Greensboro News & Record, May 9, 1985, at C2, col. 3.
129 Pitts interview, supra note 23.
30 Id.
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dence had been presented. Reaching the limits of his patience with plain-
tiffs' counsel one afternoon, Merhige sent the jury out and ordered counsel
into his chambers. The judge accused the attorney of conducting the most
disgraceful cross-examination he had seen in twenty years of practice:
You people have done a disservice to your own clients. You sued
everybody.... You didn't have a snowball's chance in hell, and I'm
satisfied you had no evidence when you brought your lawsuit .... I
am going to assess sanctions in every case, as to every individual
defendant that you sued that you don't have reasonable cause to sue.
... Now if you've got any evidence against [this defendant], I want
you to put it on and stop wasting time and costing the government
thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars, and everybody
else here, needlessly, foolishly. For what? Publicity? Let's go.'
When plaintiffs' counsel asked for an adjournment for the day and ex-
pressed concern about Merhige's "attitude of hostility," the judge retorted,
"Be concerned about it; go to the Fourth Circuit. Let's go. "132
When the plaintiffs finally rested their case, defense counsel moved to
remove their clients from the case due to the plaintiffs' failure to establish
a prima facie case. "The easy way out is to deny [all the motions]," Mer-
hige conceded. "I'm not going to take the easy way. . . If I left [all the
defendants] in, I don't think the jury would be able to make anything out
of it."' 33 Of the original sixty defendants, Merhige dismissed the suits
against fifteen individuals, including the former city manager of Greens-
boro and fourteen police officers who Merhige determined were merely
following orders from their superiors. The plaintiffs were ordered to pay
these defendants' court costs.
One of the defendants granted an early dismissal was FBI agent Tom
Brereton. He conducted the preliminary investigation of the shootings and
subsequently served as chief investigator for the special grand jury. Fol-
lowing fourteen months of extensive interviews and meticulous FBI lab
work, 3' Brereton's findings were published in a 15,000 page report.
131 Transcript of Conference in Judge's Chambers Before the Honorable Robert R. Merhige,
Jr., Apr. 26, 1985, Civil Action No. 80-605-G.
32Id.
:33 Greensboro News & Record, May 21, 1985, at B1, col. 1 (Rockingham ed.).
,' The FBI's audio-analysis tracing the origins of the 39 shots fired in the melee proved to be
crucial evidence establishing the claim of self-defense. "The 'shot chart' showed that roughly half of
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(This investigation was the second most extensive investigation in the
agency's history, exceeded only by the agency's report on the Indian upris-
ing at Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1973.)' From the beginning of
his investigation, Brereton suspected that it was only a matter of time
before he would be named as an agent-provocateur in the CWP's conspir-
acy charge. But he was unprepared for the emotional toll the suit took
upon him and his family. Guilt by association spread as public petitions
were circulated to have Brereton fired, and a speech was delivered against
him in his church. The strain was particularly hard on his wife, who
suffers from muscular dystrophy and who developed multiple complica-
tions during this period. The entire experience was emotionally draining,
leaving Brereton with an unresolved bitterness about Judge Merhige's
failure to protect the government agents named as defendants in the al-
leged political conspiracy. Brereton insists that "if the law gave half the
protection to civil defendants that is given to criminal defendants, there
would be far fewer civil suits. There is no requirement of probable cause
for a civil suit, just an open door to the courthouse."' 36
The defendants who were not dismissed from the case presented their
evidence in four (lays, far shorter than the projected four weeks of testi-
mony. The essence of their defense was that the CWP had orchestrated
the violence in order to build the party and to show that social change was
impossible without confrontation. 37 In response, the plaintiffs charged
that it was city and federal officials who used undercover agents to set up
the CWP "as bait to generate this conspiracy, this monster." 38
J. The Verdict
At the conclusion of the evidence, both plaintiffs and defendants ex-
pressed concerns over Merhige's power to control the jury by virtue of his
instructions on the law. Throughout the trial, Merhige had shielded the
the shots - 17 to 22 - came from the Communists." A Litany of "Not Guilty," TIME, Dec. 1, 1980,
at 25, 28.
15 See Bacigal, supra note 13, at 6.
'3' Interview with Thomas Brereton, FBI agent, in Greensboro, N.C. (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter
Brereton interview].
137 Days before the "Death to the Klan" rally, a CWP member confided that the CWP needed a
martyr to spur a sagging recruitment drive, and that the CWP planned to change its tactics from non-
violence to violence. Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1980, at A2, col. 2.
... Greensboro News & Record, June 6, 1985, at C2, col. 3.
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jurors from the local community's strong feelings about the racial and po-
litical issues in the case. The judge was also generally solicitous of the
jurors' physical safety and comfort, and his normal practice was to ask the
jurors to send him a list of the personal supplies that might ease the bur-
den of being sequestered. When one juror asked for Diet Coke, the local
court clerk refused the request because he could obtain only Diet Pepsi at
a discount. Merhige informed the clerk that he wanted the jury to be
happy and that Diet Coke must be provided. A week later, the clerk
handed Merhige another request from a juror and asked, "What do I do
with this one?" An elderly juror insisted that Charmin toilet tissue be
placed in all the bathrooms. When Merhige acceded to the juror's de-
mand, he ensured his status as the jury's benefactor.
Plaintiffs' counsel, Lewis Pitts, observed that Merhige is a "master at
having the jury eating out of his hand." According to Pitts, "the power of
a federal judge to control a jury is a very dangerous thing. In our case,
Merhige courted the jury and had them idolizing him. He's a very charm-
ing person. He sends implicit messages to the jury when he tells a lawyer
in open court, 'You don't have evidence here of a conspiracy, move on to.
something else.'" Pitts concedes, however, that Merhige also assisted the
attorneys by setting the tone in keeping the jury's attention as long as they
did. "If the jury's attention was waning, Merhige would give them a
drum roll by announcing, 'Now this is an important matter.' 1389
On June 6, 1985, Merhige instructed the jury as to their role in decid-
ing the case and the applicable law. Conscious of the charges that he was
manipulating the jury, Merhige prefaced his instructions with the com-
ment, "Your mind must be popping with all this legal mumbo jumbo. My
personal feeling is that I wish I could just sit down and talk with you. But
they won't let me, so I've got to do it this way."'O4 After two and a half
hours of legal instructions from the judge, the jury retired to begin delib-
erations. The next morning, the jurors informed the court that they were
unable to agree on a verdict. After consulting with counsel, Merhige
urged the jurors "not to give up at this early stage. It may be that you
need a few hours off - a day off."'' Merhige also assured the attorneys
that "I'm not leaving town in this terrible state of frustration. Not yet at
"' Pitts interview, supra note 23.
'10 Merhige interview, supra note 11.
141 Id.
19891 1175
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
least."1 42
Later in the day, after eleven and a half hours of deliberation, the jury
returned its verdict. The City of Greensboro, the federal agents, and all
but two city police officers were absolved of any wrongdoing. Verdicts
were returned against the Greensboro police field commander, J. H.
"Rooster" Cooper, control agent for Ed Dawson, and five Klan-Nazi de-
fendants, including Dawson. The jury found against these defendants on
several counts of wrongful death and assault and battery. The jury further
found that none of the defendants had participated in a conspiracy.
Damages of $398,559.55 were awarded, $358,700 of which were
granted to a non-CWP member, the widow of a slain demonstrator. A
CWP member who remains permanently paralyzed was awarded
$38,359.55, while another CWP member who received birdshot wounds
was given $1,500. Following the jury's verdict, Merhige issued a perma-
nent protective order to prevent jurors from being questioned about their
deliberations. Although Merhige acknowledged that the first amendment
entitled the jurors to voluntarily discuss the case, he admonished them that
"they'd be crazy to."' 143 Before he adjourned the court, Merhige turned to
the CWP. He acknowledged their views on the need for social reforms,
but advised: "I know of one way you don't make them, that's by spending
all your time in litigation. The incident that gave rise to this suit was
certainly tragic. I don't know of anyone, even the defendants, who don't
agree. But there ought to be an end to this litigation. '144
The plaintiffs' initial reaction to the verdict was one of disappointment.
Lead counsel Lewis Pitts speculated that the jurors "got caught up in the
ideological issues and didn't relate much to the people - the victims. 1 4
Despite his disappointment, Pitts regarded the verdict as significant be-
cause it was the first time a Southern jury held the Klan responsible for a
death. CWP leader Nelson Johnson agreed that the verdict was "a major
victory in this case and in the larger struggle for justice. 1 46 Perhaps in
response to Merhige's suggestion that there be an end to the five years of
litigation, Johnson announced, "We extend our hand in fellowship to all
242 Id.
43 Id.
144 Greensboro News & Record, June 9, 1985, at A12, col. 2.
45 Pitts interview, supra note 23.
1' Greensboro News & Record, June 9, 1985, at A12, col. 2.
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who desire to move from this day to rechannel those energies into solving
the problems of inadequate housing, jobs, equality, and peace for all our
citizens. 1 1
7
Following the trial, various motions were filed by both sides asking the
court to set aside unfavorable portions of the verdict and to grant a new
trial. When all motions were denied, the City of Greensboro's insurance
company paid the entire amount of the judgment in an attempt to put an
end to the litigation. The plaintiffs withdrew their appeals and dropped a
second lawsuit that had been filed. Nazi and Klan defendants failed to
pursue their counterclaims, and there were no further judicial inquiries
into the events surrounding the November 3 incident.
The precise sequence of events leading up to the killings may never be
discovered and the question of what prompted the first shot remains unan-
swered. The lack of definitive answers to such questions is due to the fact
that there was nothing precise about the incident. FBI agent Thomas
Brereton filed a 15,000 page investigation of the incident, but concluded
that there was no conspiracy or well-thought-out plan of action by either
side. Brereton characterizes the incident as a street fight that got out of
hand:
Both groups had the mentality of juvenile gangs. Judge Merhige
and I were both raised in New York City and can understand that.
Few gang fights ever start with the idea of killing. One gang says
we'll be there and to make sure we don't get hurt, we're bringing
our sticks, clubs, knives, and guns. The other group does the same
thing. They all get together and there is spontaneous escalation.
They hit cars with sticks to show how powerful they are. Someone
gets knocked down and kicked. To scare off the aggressor, someone
shoots into the air. The guy on the other side responds and shoots
his gun in the air. The two stand there firing, staring each other
down. About a hundred yards away, the rest hear the shots and say,
'Holy shit, they're shooting.' They run and get their guns then open
a barrage of gun fire. Then everyone is dead and wounded and the
survivors say, 'Gee, what happened?' What happened in Greensboro
was that these 'rival gangs' met face-to-face and just blew up. 48
147 Id.
14' Brereton interview, supra note 136.
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CONCLUSION
If the facts underlying the Greensboro case remain unclear, the role
that Judge Merhige played in the litigation is equally ambiguous. Assess-
ing Merhige's performance in controversial cases, a prominent constitu-
tional scholar characterized the judge as "a problem-solver and an ac-
tivist"' 49 akin to the late Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas.
According to this scholar, "[b]oth men seem to have a distinct awareness
of the way judges could use power and equity to the benefit of society."'"5
The characterizations of Merhige as a "liberal activist" trace back to the
start of his judicial career when he ordered the release of militant black
leader H. Rap Brown and issued the first judicial ruling that the Vietnam
conflict was a war within the meaning of the Constitution. While ordering
massive busing and school consolidations in the former capital of the Con-
federacy, Richmond, Virginia, Merhige spoke out from the bench:
I'm ashamed and embarrassed that we let these things develop. Who
said this stupid thing about human beings riding on the back of the
bus? Who said this stupid thing about not letting people live where
they choose? Integration is not only the law, it's the right thing to
do. And I feel good about doing the right thing. 5 '
In light of Merhige's reputation for outspokenness, the Greensboro liti-
gants had hoped that the judge would permit them to turn the trial into a
morality play wherein the victims could tell their tragic stories, and the
judge (like a modern Greek chorus) could certify the truth while defining
good and evil. If litigation is civilization's answer to revolution, then the
Greensboro trial was a final confrontation between political zealots who
apparently had gotten what they sought from violence itself. The
Klansmen and Nazis used the violent encounter to rebut charges of cow-
ardice and to boast that they had gunned down five "dirty commies.' 1 52 In
turn, the CWP touted its five dead "martyrs" as proof that there was no
justice under capitalism. The only task that remained for the judge was to
verify either side's version of the facts.
149 N.Y. Times, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 4, col. 2 (statement of Professor A.E. Dick Howard).
50 Id.
1' Bacigal & Bacigal, supra note 14, at 725.
152 Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1980, at A2, col. 2. One defendant insisted that, "Anytime you defeat
communism it's a victory for America." Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1980, at A2, col. 1.
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Although Merhige lived up to his activist reputation by procedurally
shaping the scope, tenor, and content of the proceedings, he refused to
openly discuss the substantive merits of either side's case. Deprived of a
definitive ruling on the morality of their positions, the litigants attacked
Merhige's procedural rulings. The CWP characterized Merhige as a rep-
resentative of a conservative judicial system which had distorted the law in
order to permit Klansmen and Nazis to take advantage of a loophole in
the Civil Rights Act.153 According to the CWP, the time constraints
placed on the plaintiffs"" and Merhige's tolerance of the Klan'55 created
a trial atmosphere favorable to the racist elements in society. On the other
hand, the Klansmen and Nazi defendants charged that the "liberal" judge
had manipulated the proceedings' 56 to ensure that only the radical plain-
tiffs could receive a full hearing on the charges. Both sides could agree
only on their allegation that the judge had abused his discretion in an
attempt to move the proceedings toward a result which fit the judge's per-
sonal perception of justice.
The parties' criticism of Merhige's judicial conduct in the Greensboro
case presents a microcosm of the historic struggle for a working compro-
mise between two ideals: judicial discretion (the trained intuition of the
judge) on the one hand, and the letter of the law (superior to and binding
upon the judge), on the other. With respect to substantive law choices, the
controversy over judicial discretion is reflected in the Hart-Dworkin dis-
pute about the way judges function "at the margin of rules and in the
fields left open by the theory of precedents.' 5 7 Hart argues that situations
arise in which no rule is clearly appropriate, and so the judge must exer-
cise broad discretion. In contrast, Dworkin maintains that a judge is never
free from authoritative legal standards to decide as he wishes. 5
Judicial discretion, however, is not limited to the type of substantive
law choices which Hart and Dworkin debate. It was apparent in the
Greensboro case that judicial discretion also extended to procedures, tim-
ing, degrees of emphasis, and many other subsidiary factors. No matter
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 104-15.
... See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
... See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
156 See supra text accompanying note 98.
H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961).
"8 Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 38 (R. Dworkin ed.
1977).
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how minute and detailed the body of substantive rules articulated by
scholars and appellate courts, no system of justice is administered "wholly
by rule without any recourse to the will of the judge and his personal
sense of what should be done to achieve a just result in the cause before
him."1" At one extreme, the judge's perception of a just result may be
whimsical and depend on the individual idiosyncrasies of the judge. At the
other extreme, the judge's discretion may accommodate changes in social
attitude and enable the law to reflect the "moral sense of the
community." ' o
A trial judge's effort to ensure a just result in the particular case may
come in conflict with the concept of an adversary system which leaves the
responsibility of presenting the case to the parties. While a judge who
subscribes to a doctrine of judicial restraint may content himself to func-
tion as an umpire or arbiter, merely reacting to the issues framed by the
litigants, an "activist" trial judge is more prone to believe that distortions
arising from the commitments of the adversaries will produce injustice. By
inaction, the judge may become the abetting instrument of injustice.
Trial counsel's ability to control the presentation of the Greensboro case
was affected by Judge Merhige's largely discretionary rulings with respect
to: 1) the timing of the case - the plaintiffs insisted that they were not
given adequate time to probe and expose the alleged government conspir-
acy; 2) the selection of the jury - both sides charged that the judge im-
paneled a jury prejudiced against them; 3) the scope of the cognizable
claims - the plaintiffs maintained that recognition of the counterclaims
was a travesty of justice, while the defendants charged that the judge sepa-
rated the counterclaims in a deliberate attempt to undermine the defend-
ants' position; 4) the questioning of witnesses - successful advocacy may
depend on the flow of questions, and if counsel is interrupted by an "ac-
tivist" judge, a carefully planned line of questioning may be irreparably
destroyed; 5) the efforts to stop counsel from wasting the court's time,
from acting unfairly toward the opposing party, or from misleading the
jury - in the eyes of the jury, counsel and client are so closely identified
that a trial judge's belittling of counsel may be prejudicial to the client; 6)
the public nature of the proceedings - the defendants requested that the
:9 2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 355 (1959).
160 Id. at 367.
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court issue gag orders, while the plaintiffs employed a full-time media
specialist; 7) the instructing and administrative handling of the jury -
jurors are undoubtedly influenced by any lead, or suspected lead, which
the judge gives.
Many of the trial judge's rulings concerning scheduling, joinder of
counterclaims, and the like, are subject to appellate review, although the
rulings may be so grounded in the particular facts of the case that they are
reviewed only for gross abuse of discretion. Other rulings and actions of
the trial judge are, as a practical matter, beyond appellate review. In the
absence of videotaping of trials, the appellate court cannot assess the trial
judge's tone, his emphasis, his smile or his shrugs when receiving evidence
or instructing the jury. In the Greensboro case, the most serious charge of
abuse of judicial discretion, and the one least subject to appellate review,
was the claim that Judge Merhige's "courting" of the jury enabled him to
manipulate the jury to a desired result, assuming that the judge in fact
desired a certain result.
Complaints of judicial bias lodged by dissatisfied litigants, particularly
litigants with strongly-held political beliefs, must be viewed with skepti-
cism. Although the litigants have first-hand experience with the judge's
performance, their status as advocates weakens their neutrality and objec-
tivity. Unfortunately, there are also weaknesses in overtly objective and
theoretical analysis which divorce the issue of judicial discretion from the
specific factual occurrences within the course of a trial. Empirical ac-
counts of a judge's efforts to provide soft toilet tissue for elderly jurors
may approach the theater of the absurd, but it is equally meaningless to
reduce discussions of judicial conduct to theoretical platitudes. Like many
jurists, Judge Merhige attempts to circumvent discussion of his "activist"
bent by invoking Chief Justice Marshall's sentiment that his greatest sat-
isfaction was that he never sought to "enlarge the judicial power beyond
its proper bounds, nor feared to carry it to the fullest extent that duty
required."'
Such lofty words can be given content only by placing them within the
context of actual litigation. This empirical account of the Greensboro case
has described the turbulent world in which civil rights cases arise in order
101 Letter from Chief Justice John Marshall to the Philadelphia Bar (1831), quoted in 4 A.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 522 (1919).
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to provide a context in which to assess the role of trial judges in such
cases. The acid test of a theory of the judicial function is not whether the
theory is "true" in a purely scientific sense, but whether the theory is
useful in describing the "real world."' 62
102 Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38, 92-93
(1985).
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APPENDIX A
Chronology of Events Surrounding the Shootings
1979
July 8 - The CWP (then known as the Workers Viewpoint Organi-
zation) confronts a Klan recruiting rally in China Grove, North Carolina.
Sept. 22 - CWP leader Nelson Johnson applies for a parade permit
for a "Death to the Klan" rally.
Nov. 1 - Klan leader Virgil Griffin sends representatives to urge Na-
zis to join the Klansmen in presenting a united racist front at the rally.
Nov. 3 - Four CWP members die in a shootout between Klansmen,
Nazis, and anti-Klan demonstrators. A fifth dies two days later. Eight
people are injured.
Nov. 11 - Four hundred CWP members and sympathizers stage a
funeral march. More than a thousand police, National Guardsmen, and
reporters are at the march.
1980
June 16 - Six Klansmen and Nazis stand trial for murder in state
criminal prosecutions. CWP supporters demonstrate outside the court-
house and create a disturbance within the courtroom.
Nov. 3 - CWP members file a civil rights suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging that Klansmen
and Nazis conspired with city, state, and federal agents to violate their
civil rights.
Nov. 17 - An all-white jury acquits six Klan and Nazi defendants in
the state criminal trial.
1981
Mar. 2 - Federal agents arrest six Nazis on charges that they
planned to detonate bombs in Greensboro if the defendants in the state
murder trial had been convicted.
Sept. 18 - The six Nazis charged in the bomb plot are convicted in a
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second trial. (The first trial ended in a hung jury.)
1982
Mar. 22 - A federal grand jury begins investigating the November
3, 1979 shootings.
May 3 - Plaintiffs in the civil rights suit amend their complaint to
seek $48 million in damages.
1983
Jan. 24 - 88 Seconds in Greensboro, a public television documen-
tary, reviews the shootings and reveals the role played by undercover
agent Eddie Dawson.
Apr. 21 - A federal grand jury indicts nine Klansmen and Nazis for
conspiring to violate the civil rights of the slain demonstrators.
Dec. 3 - U.S. District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. is appointed to
preside over the civil rights suit. He schedules trial to begin August 1,
1984.
1984
Jan. 9 - The federal criminal trial for nine Klan and Nazi defend-
ants begins with secret jury selection in Winston-Salem, North Carolina
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
Apr. 15 - An all-white jury acquits the nine defendants of charges of
violating the civil rights of the demonstrators.
June 16 - Judge Merhige reschedules the trial date for the civil suit
in response to attorneys' request for additional time for pretrial
preparation.
Sept. 5 - Judge Merhige again resets the date for trial.
Nov. 9 - The events surrounding the November 3 shootout are drama-
tized in an off-Broadway play entitled Jerico.
1985
Feb. 19 - Plaintiffs in the civil rights suit file a motion to move the
trial out of North Carolina because of five years of prejudicial publicity
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from regional media. (The motion is eventually denied.)
Mar. 11 - The civil rights trial begins.
Mar. 21 - Judge Merhige approves the defendants' counterclaims, but
orders that they will be tried separately.
Mar. 25 - A jury of five whites and one black is selected to hear the
lawsuit.
June 7 - The jury returns a verdict against two Greensboro police
officers, a police informant, and five Klansmen and Nazis.
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APPENDIX B*
DATE: October 22, 1979
RE: AN OPEN LETTER TO JOE GRADY, GORRELL PIERCE,
AND ALL KKK MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS
Klansmen Joe Grady and Gorrell Pierce,
The KKK is one of the most treacherous scum elements produced by
the dying system of capitalism. Your treacherousness is exceeded only by
those who promote and scretly [sic] support you. You, as the so-called
leaders deserve the full hatred and wrath of the people. Your program is
based on lies and is being promoted to fan racial and national prejudices.
It is used to turn worker against worker, white against black, Indians, or
Chicano, Protestant against Catholic, or Jews. The Klan is being pro-
moted to make it harder to fight this capitalist system which is the real
source of the problems of the American people.
Grady and Pierce, you and your Klan followers put up a brave front.
But when the surface is scratched, you are nothing but a bunch of racist
cowards. Your militant front is calculated to attract whites and particu-
larly white youths who are being crushed daily by this system and who
are mad and looking for someone to fight. You hope to frighten and ter-
rify blacks, Jews, and anyone who fights against this system. You don
your hoods and run around with guns spreading your poison. But, as we
showed in China Grove, the Klan is a bunch of cowards.
We are having a march and conference on November 3, 1979 to further
expose your cowardness, why the Klan is so consciously being promoted,
and to organize to physically smash the racist KKK wherever it rears its
ugly head. Yes, we challenged you to attend our November 3rd rally in
Greensboro. We publicly re-new that challenge. You were quoted in the
AP press release as saying that "if the communists think they are going to
get me to attack them, they are crazy as hell." No Grady and Pierce -
we are not crazy. We are very clear on what you are doing and that you
and the KKK are a bunch of two-bit cowards. You "invited" us to show
up at Klan rallies. Grady and Pierce, we accept! Where in the hell are
you holding your scrum [sic] rallies? You cowards manage to keep the
* All emphasis in original.
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location of your rallies. a secret. We challenge you to say in public where
and when you hold your rallies so that the people can organize to chase
you off the face of the earth.
It would be improper if we ended without emphasizing why the KKK
is treacherous. The Klan wants people to think that we are paying a dol-
lar a gallon for gas and being laid off by the tens of thousands because of
"niggers and Jews." At the same time, you say people won't work because
they are lazy and that causes inflation. Who benefits from this vicious
racist, program of Klan lies? Certainly not white workers, white youth, or
white people generally. Not Indians, black people, or chicanos. Grady and
Pierce, only the rich, the ruling class, the capitalists benefit from what the
Klan is doing.
What you do is disorganize the people and make it difficult for workers
and oppressed people of all races and national backgrounds to unite and
fight together against the daily abuses of the capitalist system. But, in
spite of your treacherousness, the Klan will be smashed physically. Grady
and Pierce, all Klanspeople, and your Nazi friends - you are a tempo-
rary pest and obstruction in our fight to end all exploitation and oppres-
sion. But, we take you seriously and we will show you no mercy.
DEATH TO THE KLAN!!!
Workers Viewpoint Organization (WVO)
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